VoluntaryDisclosureofListedCompaniestoexplore
Abstract:andtheUnitedStatesc[url=http://www.yezizhuzhu.cn/][color=Black]叶子猪[/color][/url]ompared,althoughinrecentyears,China'smarketparticipantsmorecloselythestabilityofthesecuritiesmarketdevelopmentissues,therelevantdepartmentsofinformationdisclosureoflistedcompaniesgovernanceproblemsparticularattention,butthedomesticresearchorFewinvolvedintheissueofvoluntarydisclosure.Thepurposeofthispaperthrougharandomsampleof45ofChina'sShanghaiandShenzhenlistedcompaniestodisclosetheannualreportof2004carriedoutasampleanalysis,withaviewtofindavoluntarydisclosureinChinacanhardlybethecruxofthefulldevelopment,drawingonvoluntarydisclosureoftheoutcomeoftheUnitedStatestoclarifythevoluntarydisclosurethenecessityandpossibilityofthecorrespondingsolutionsandideas.[Keywords]voluntarydisclosure;annualanalysis;analyticalreportsAtpresent,thestockmarketandstabledevelopmentofthemarkethasalreadyattractedattentioninthecloseattentionofthepartiesinvolved,governanceoflistedcompaniestodiscloseinformationontheexistenceofthisproblemfocusontheestablishmentofaneffectivecorporategovernancestructureandimprovethesecuritieslegislation,thereformoftheintermediaryinstitutions,etc.,whichwillimprovetheinformationdisclosureoflistedcompaniesinChinaauthenticity,timelinessplayapositiverole,whilevoluntarydisclosureofinformationdisclosuretoimprovetherelevanceandimprovetheinformationdisclosureoflistedcompaniesinChinathestatusquo,butalsoplaysanimportantrole.I.AHistoricalReview(a)voluntarydisclosureofthetheoreticalbasisandassumptions1.Meckling1976agenttheoryJensenandyear-agenttheoryisdefinedas:acontract,inthiscontract,apersonormorepeople(clients)theemploymentofanotherperson(theagent)torepresentthemtocarryoutcertainservices,includinganumberofdecision-makingpowerentrustedtoanagent.Intheagencytheory,theenterprisewasseenasaseriesofcontractofassociation.Clientsandagentsareeconomicallyrationalpeople,arethepursuitofutilitymaximization,theagentinpursuitofhigherpayandleisure,willnotalwaysconsidertherealizationoftheclient'sbestinterests,onthecontrary,thereistheexpenseoftheclient'sbestintereststoachievetheobjectivesofthemotivesoftheirown,theyhavehadaproblemofagencycosts.Outsideshareholderscannotbedirectlyobservedasaresultoftheactionstheagentneedstosigncontractswithagentstotheirsupervision,thesupervisoryagentcontractwillcostthecostofimplementation,resultinginacorrespondinglowerreturnoninvestment,themanagerofthebonuses,dividendsandotherremunerationmayalsobeaffected.Therefore,managershavetomaintainsupervisionofthemotivesofthelowestcost.Maintainaminimumofsupervisionandthecostisameansofvoluntarydisclosureofinformationsothatclientswanttoknowabouthisinformation,thehighertheagencycosts,managersofvoluntarydisclosureofinformationonthestrongermotive.2.Signalingtheory,iftheownershipofprivateinformationmanagershavethemeansoftheirprivateinformationtoinvestorsintheabsenceofinformation,ortoinduceinvestorsunderthevoluntarydisclosureofprivateinformation,thetransactionwillbeabletorealizeParetoImprovement.Therefore,managershaveanincentivetoshowtheirtype,selectacertainsignal,sothatinvestorsc
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